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Abstract—We propose POWERALERT, an efficient external
integrity checker for untrusted hosts. Current attestation systems
suffer from shortcomings in requiring complete checksum of the
code segment, being static, use of timing information sourced
from the untrusted machine, or use of timing information
with high error (network round trip time). We address those
shortcomings by (1) using power measurements from the host
to ensure that the checking code is executed and (2) checking a
subset of the kernel space over a long period of time. We compare
the power measurement against a learned power model of the
execution of the machine and validate that the execution was
not tampered. Finally, power diversifies the integrity checking
program to prevent the attacker from adapting. We implement a
prototype of POWERALERT using Raspberry pi and evaluate the
performance of the integrity checking program generation. We
model the interaction between POWERALERT and an attacker
as a game. We study the effectiveness of the random initiation
strategy in deterring the attacker. The study shows that POW-
ERALERT forces the attacker to trade-off stealthiness for the risk
of detection, while still maintaining an acceptable probability of
detection given the long lifespan of stealthy attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Computer systems are managing most aspects of our lives
including critical infrastructure, communication, finance, and
health care. Those computers enable better control of the
systems achieving more efficiency while promising reliability
and security. In reality, the promise of security is elusive
and is often disrupted by the new exploits and attacks. Over
time, the attacks are getting more sophisticated, targeted,
and elusive. Since the most secure systems are bound to
be compromised, intrusion resiliency as a protection strategy
has a better chance at improving security. The resiliency
strategy considers compromises inevitable; it moves to detect
attacks and devises methods to control a compromise while
maintaining an acceptable level of service. Thus critical to
such a strategy is the ability to detect compromises and devise
methods to find optimal responses that modify the system to
maintain security and service goals.
In this work, we tackle the problem of software integrity
checking in the face of Advanced Persistent Threat (APT).
APTs are sophisticated, targeted attacks against a computing
system containing a high-value asset [18]. APTs slowly per-
form a series of steps in order to gain access and perform
an attack. The sequence of steps is often called the kill
chain [9] and starts from social engineering to gain credentials,
command-and-control through backdoors, lateral movement to
find the high-value asset, and data exfiltration or manipulation.
Known APTs, such a Stuxnet, are slow and stealthy with op-
erations spanning months to years to achieve the desired goal.
APTs require meticulous planning and tremendous resources;
typically available to nation state actors.
A resiliency strategy is vulnerable to a well-planned adver-
sary. The adversary will manipulate monitoring information,
necessary for intrusion detection, leading to a false state of
security. We propose a system that tackles the following
question: How to validate the integrity of software against
a slow and stealthy attacker without any trusted components
in the machine?
We believe that any pure software solution to the integrity
problem cannot address the problem as it faces the Liar’s
paradox. In this paradox a liar states that they are lying;
for example declaring “This statement is false”. In trying to
verify the statement, we reach a contradiction. In a computer
setting, a software assesses the state of the machine where
it dwells. The paradox arises when the machine declares
itself compromised. Even though an attacker does not have an
incentive to declare a compromised state, the paradox remains
an issue.
For a checker to avoid the paradox, it should (1) be
independent of the machine to be checked and (2) use a
trust base that cannot be exploited by an attacker. Today’s
golden standard in security uses in-machine tamper resistant
chips (such as TPM or AMT) that hold secrets to generate
chains of trust. Those solutions are dependent on the untrusted
machine and are closed source, making them vulnerable to
undiscovered exploits.
In order to address the problem, we propose POWERALERT,
a low-cost out-of-box integrity checker that uses the physics
of the machine as a trust base. Specifically, POWERALERT
directly measures the current drawn by the processor and
uses current models to validate the behavior of the untrusted
machine. The intuition is that an attacker attempting evasive
maneuvers or deception will have to use extra energy thus
drawing extra current. POWERALERT uses direct measurement
of the current and avoids using sensors on-board the untrusted
machine as those could be tampered. Moreover, timing infor-
mation extracted from the signal is very accurate (as opposed
to network round trip time which is dependent on the network
conditions).
POWERALERT tackles the classical problem of the static
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defender. A static defender is always at a disadvantage with
respect to an attacker, as the attacker can learn the protection
mechanism, adapt, and evade the defender. We use a dynamic
integrity checking program (IC-Program) that is generated
each time POWERALERT attempts to check the integrity of
the machine. Diversity of the IC-Program evens the playing
field between the attacker and defender.
Each time POWERALERT decides to check the integrity
of the machine it initiates the POWERALERT-protocol. It
randomly generates the IC-program and a nonce, and sends
the pair to the machine. Meanwhile, it starts measuring the
current drawn by the processor. The untrusted machine is
expected to load the program, to run it, and to return the
output. POWERALERT validates the observed behavior by
comparing the current signal to the learned current model.
The IC-Program traverses a small set of addresses and hashes
them using a randomly generated hash function. The output of
the IC-Program is similarly validated. We show that a low-cost
low-power device can efficiently generate the IC-Programs and
that the space of IC-Programs is almost impossible to exhaust.
We reduce the overhead of continuous integrity checking by
performing the checks in small batches over a small segment
of the state of the machine. We model the interaction between
the attacker and a POWERALERT verifier using a continuous
time game and simulate it over a period of 10 days. The
attacker attempts to evade the integrity checks by disabling
its malicious activities at randomly chosen time instants. Our
results show the POWERALERT verifier forces the attacker into
a trade-off between stealthiness and the risk of detection. An
attacker that wants to remain stealthy would need to disable its
activities for longer periods of time, while an attacker seeking
longer activity periods incurs high risks of detection. We also
show that if the verifier is moving too slowly (i.e., not making
too many checks), the attacker can achieve stealthiness and a
low risk of detection while taking less frequent actions.
The paper is organized as follows: the Problem description
(Section II), the System Model and Threat Model (Section III),
the POWERALERT-Protocol (Section IV), the Generation of
IC-Programs (Section V), the method for current signal pro-
cessing and model learning (Section VI), the attacker-verifier
game (Section VII), the Evaluation (Section VIII), a security
analysis (Section X), Related Work (Section XI), and Conclu-
sion (Section XII).
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
We tackle the problem of low-cost trustworthy dynamic in-
tegrity checking of software running on an untrusted machine.
The goal of the integrity checker is to detect unwanted changes
in the known uncompromised static state of a system, while
being resilient to attacker evasion and deception.
Definition II.1. System State. Let Xt =
(xt(0), xt(1), . . . , xt(n)) be the state of a system at
time t. The set of locations L defines the memory locations
(addresses) in the state such that for l ∈ L : Xt(l) = xt(l).
Let Xgt be the known uncompromised state of the system
and Xrt (t) be the current state of the system. A location lc
is compromised iff Xgt (lc) 6= Xrt (lc). Let Lc ∈ L be the
set of compromised addresses. A machine is compromised iff
|Lc| > 0.
The integrity checker detects if a system is compromised
by comparing it to a known uncompromised state at time t.
Definition II.2. Integrity Checker. Let f : (X × X × L) →
{0, 1} be the integrity checking function. f(Xg, Xr, L) re-
turns 1 if the any of the locations in L are compromised,
otherwise it returns 0.
Let Tc be the instance of time at which a system is
compromised and Lc be the set of locations of compromise
in said system.
The integrity checking problem is concerned with find-
ing a sequence of times T = (t1, t2, t3, . . .) to design
and run an integrity checker f for a subset of loca-
tions L = (L1, L2, L3, . . .), such that the compromise
is eventually detected with minimum overhead. That is
f(Xg(ti), X
c(ti), Li) = 1 such that ti > Tc and Li ∈ Lc.
Finally, the integrity checking process should be validated
using side information i(t) in order to avoid deception by an
adversary.
Two trade-offs between effectiveness and performance
emerge due to the selection of addresses to be checked and
the sequences of times to perform the checks. First, the more
addresses are checked the higher the chance that the integrity
checker will detect the compromise (due to higher coverage),
but that comes at a higher cost for the machine and the checker.
Second, if the frequency of checks is high then the checker
has a higher chance of detection, but that comes at a higher
cost for the machine.
Finally, the integrity checker should be resistant to attacker
deception. The deception can be done either by supplying
modified answers, disabling the security checking altogether,
or disabling the alerting capabilities (that is in case the checker
does detect that alerting is disabled). We study the effect of
the strategy of the integrity checker in detecting an attacker
that attempts to hide in anticipation of a check in Section VII.
III. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
In order to address the problem of dynamic integrity check-
ing of software (mainly the static memory in the kernel) on an
untrusted machine, we propose POWERALERT, an out-of-box
device that checks the integrity of an untrusted machine. In this
section, we describe our approach for the solution explaining
the architecture of POWERALERT, protection assumptions, and
the threat model.
A. Solution Approach
On a high level, POWERALERT is a trusted external low-
cost box tied to the untrusted machine. Figure 1 shows the
architecture of POWERALERT. The box runs a verification
protocol, POWERALERT-protocol, on the untrusted machine.
Briefly, the protocol sends a randomly generated integrity
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Fig. 1: The components of PowerAlert.
checking program, called the IC-program, and a nonce to
the untrusted machine. The machine runs the program, which
hashes parts of the static memory, and returns a response
to POWERALERT. POWERALERT checks the response and
compares it to the known state of the untrusted machine.
In order to validate that only the IC-program is running,
POWERALERT measures the current drawn by the processor
of the machine and compares it to the current model for
normal behavior. The power model is specific to the processor
model and thus has to be learned for each machine. During
the initialization of POWERALERT, the machine is assumed
uncompromised. POWERALERT instruments the machine by
measuring the current drawn by the processor while running
operations semantically similar to the POWERALERT-protocol.
POWERALERT learns a power model specific to the machine
that is later used for validation. Even while using the cur-
rent signal for validation, attackers might evade detection
by modifying the integrity checking program. Researchers
typically attempt to implement the most optimized version
of the checking program, thus forcing the attacker to incur
extra clock cycles for evasion. Instead, we take a different
approach by randomly generating an IC-program every time
the POWERALERT-protocol is initiated. The diversity of the
IC-program prevents the attacker from adapting, thus making
deception harder.
B. Threat Model
We assume a fairly powerful attacker when it comes to
the untrusted machine; the attacker has complete control over
the software. However, we assume that the attacker does not
modify the hardware of the machine; for example, the attacker
does not change the CPU speed, or modify firmware. We do
not assume any trusted modules or components on the machine
to be tested. Our trust base is derived from the randomness of
the protocol and physical properties of the CPU.
We assume that the attacker runs deceptive countermeasures
to hide her presence and deceive the verifier into a false
sense of security, and attempt to reverse-engineer the integrity-
checking program for future attempts. Specifically, the attacker
can do the following:
• Reverse engineer the program through static and dynamic
analysis. Static analysis allows the attacker to figure out
the functionality of the program without running the
program. With dynamic analysis, the attacker attempts
to understand the functionality of the program if it was
obfuscated.
• Tamper with the program or the state of the machine in
order to supply the checker with the “correct” answer. In
this case, the attacker needs to understand the function-
ality of the IC-Program.
• Impersonate a clean system state by either creating a
new program that has similar behavior or using a virtual
machine.
We aim for our approach to resist the following attacks:
• Proxy attack: The attacker uses a proxy remote machine
with the correct state to compute the correct checksum
and returns the result to the verifier.
• Data Pointer redirection: The attacker attempts to mod-
ify the data pointer that is loaded from memory.
• Static analysis: The attacker analyzes the IC-program
to determine its control flow and functionality within
the time needed to compute the result. The attacker can
precompute and store the results, find location of memory
load instructions, or find efficient methods to manipulate
the IC-program [28].
• Active analysis: The attacker instruments the IC-Program
to find memory load instructions in order to manipulate
the program.
• Attacker hiding: The attacker uses compression [23] or
ROP storage [5] in data memory to hide the malicious
changes when the POWERALERT-protocol is running.
• Forced retraining: The attacker forces POWERALERT to
retrain models by simulating a hardware fault resulting in
a change in hardware.
We alleviate those threats by changing the IC-Program on
every check, flattening the control structure of the IC-Program,
and observing the current trace for abnormal behavior.
C. Assumptions
In this work, we assume that POWERALERT is a trusted
external entity. Having POWERALERT be an external box as
opposed to being an internal module aids in separating the
boundaries between the entities. The clear boundary allows us
to find a clear attack surface, enables easier alerting capabili-
ties, and easier methods to update POWERALERT when vulner-
abilities or new features are added. Moreover, we assume that
the communication channel between POWERALERT and the
untrusted machine is not compromised. While this assumption
can be relaxed by using authentication, we opt to address it
in future work.
We assume that POWERALERT has a truly random number
generator that cannot be predicted by an attacker. Unpre-
dictability is essential for the integrity checking function to
be effective. The attacker should not be able to predict the
defender’s strategy for initiating the POWERALERT-protocol.
Moreover, the attacker should not be able to predict the IC-
Program that will be generated. If the attacker can predict
the program, then the attacker can adapt and deceive POW-
ERALERT.
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We also assume that POWERALERT has complete knowl-
edge of the normal state of the machine. POWERALERT
uses the known state to verify the output from the untrusted
machine.
Finally, the current measurements are part of our trust
based. Those measurements are directly acquired and thus they
cannot be tampered with; the learned models are based on
the physical properties of the system which cannot be altered.
Any attacker computation, such as static analysis of the IC-
program, will manifest in the current signal.
IV. POWERALERT PROTOCOL
We model the interaction between POWERALERT and the
untrusted machine as an interrogation between a verifier and
prover. We name the protocol that defines the interaction the
POWERALERT-protocol. The goal of the checker is to verify
that the prover has the correct proof; in this case, we are
interested in the state of the kernel text and data structures.
On a high-level, the verifier requests the state of a random
subset of the kernel state and the prover has to produce the
results. Instead of directly requesting the memory locations,
the verifier sends a randomly generated function that hashes
a subset of the kernel state. The verifier correlates current
measurement and side-channel information with the expected
runtime of the sent function. The POWERALERT-protocol is
repeated over time; positive results increase confidence that the
kernel’s integrity is preserved. In the following, we describe
the interactions in the POWERALERT-protocol.
Figure ?? shows the interactions when the POWERALERT-
protocol is initiated. At a random instance in time, based on
the initiation strategy developed in section VII, the verifier
initiates the POWERALERT-protocol. The verifier starts by
randomly generating a hash function f , a random function to
generate a random set of address positions L, and a nonce
η. In this setting, the hash function f is the IC-program.
The verifier connects to the prover and sends the random
parameters < f,L, η >. The prover is then supposed to
load the hash function, f , and run it with inputs L and η.
Meanwhile, POWERALERT measures and records the current
drawn by the processor i(t). Subsequently, the prover sends
the output of the hash function back to the verifier. Finally, the
verifier stops recording the current trace, confirms the output,
and validates the expected execution with i(t)– the measured
current drawn by the processor.
The verifier introduces uncertainty by changing the hash
function, order of-, the subset of-addresses, and the nonce.
The uncertainty makes it extremely hard for a deceptive prover
to falsify the output. Changing the hash function prevents the
attacker from adapting to the verifier’s strategy; changing the
addresses and nonce prevents the attacker from predicting the
verifier’s target.
In the following sections, we define the method for gener-
ating the hash functions, the strategy for picking a subset of
memory addresses, and the method for measuring current and
trace correlation.
V. INTEGRITY CHECKING PROGRAM
POWERALERT uses the Integrity Checking program, IC-
program, to check the integrity of the untrusted machine. We
use diversity instead of a static well-designed IC-program.
It is typical for designers to engineer a static well-designed
IC-programs. The design typically focuses on hash collision
resistance and seek an optimal runtime implementation. A hash
collision allows the attacker to find a system state that hashes
to the correct value. Thus hash collision resistance ensures
that the attacker does not deceive the verifier. An optimal
runtime implementation ensures that a memory redirection
attack significantly increases the runtime of the IC-program.
A memory redirection attack is when the attacker keeps
an uncompromised copy of the state; all memory reads are
redirected to the copy.
Once the static IC-program is used the attacker adapts
and finds evasive methods to deceive the verifier. A hash
function previously thought collision resistant might become
vulnerable. Moreover, an implementation once thought optimal
might be evaded by an ingenious attacker. This is the problem
of the static defender, the attacker can always find a method to
circumvent the protection mechanism. In this arms race, even
if the attacker is detected the first time the protection method
is revealed, the attacker will adapt and find new methods
to hide. An attacker will have enough resources beyond the
compromised machine to adapt.
In this work, we take a different approach to address the
problem. Instead of building the strongest mechanism possible,
we build a changing mechanism that prevents the attacker
from adapting. Specifically, we randomly generate a new IC-
program each time the POWERALERT-Protocol is initiated
and choose a randomized input set. The input set is drawn
randomly from the address space of kernel text and read-only
data.
We want to force the untrusted machine to run the IC-
program without modification. The IC-program has to be
resistant to active and passive (static) analysis: to counter
active analysis, we change the program every time and thus
make it hard for the attacker to catch-up; to counter passive
analysis, the program is lightly obfuscated by flattening the
control flow structure so that attacker analysis will show up
in the power trace. We present the method for generating the
IC-program in the following sections.
A. IC-Program Structure
The IC-Program’s purpose is to hash a subset of the state
of the untrusted machine, in order to assess the integrity of
the machine. The general flow of the program is a loop that
reads a new memory location and updates the state of the hash
function.
We obfuscate the high-level structure by flattening the
control graph of the program using the technique in [32].
The obfuscated program makes it harder for the attacker to
locate the load instructions necessary for a memory redirection
attack. Any static or active analysis will be observed on the
power trace and thus can be detected.
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Algorithm V.1 IC-Program Pseudocode
Require: Address space size N and nonce η
Initiate hash function with η, h = f(h, η)
for n ∈ [0, N ] do
A := generate random address
x := load A
Update hash, h = f(h, x)
end for
It is important to note that the program that is randomly
generated is not polymorphic, that is the functionality of the
program changes, not just the structure.
B. Populating the Addresses
Given the static portion of the kernel’s virtual address
space which starts from Llow to Lhigh, a selection algo-
rithm selects an ordered subset of the space for integrity
checking. The ordered subset is a list of address tuples;
each tuple contains an address and the number of words
to read <base address, words> (the size of the word
is equivalent to the number of bytes 4/8). For example,
the tuple <0xffffffff81c000000, 4> reads 4 words
starting from address 0xffffffff81c000000. The output
of the selection algorithm is a list of the following form:
A =< A1, k1 >, . . . < Aj , kj >; the expanded form of
the list is A1, A1 + 1, . . . , Aj + 1, . . . , Aj + kj . The selection
algorithm takes as an input the total number of bytes N . The
algorithm generates a random list of address tuples such that∑
ki = N . The selection algorithm is embedded in the IC-
Program; it is simply a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR).
Another important property of the address list is coverage; we
define coverage as the fraction of selected bytes over the total
size of the system. Specifically cov(A) = N/(Lhigh −Llow).
The coverage affects the cost of running the IC-Program, and
the probability that a given round of POWERALERT-Protocol
checks a compromised address.
C. LFSR generation
A new hash function is used for every run of the protocol.
We propose chaining randomly generated LFSRs, the outputs
of which are combined using a nonlinear Boolean function.
Figure 2 shows the high-level configuration of the hash func-
tion. Each LFSR is enabled depending on the address being
processed. The outputs of the LFSRs are accumulated with
the data in a k bit vector. In the following, we explain the
method for generating and chaining the LFSRs. The LFSRs
are generated using irreducible polynomials in a Galois Field.
The configuration of LFSRs is generated using a random tree
that specifies the control flow of the program.
An LFSR is related to polynomials in Galois field GF (2).
The process for generating maximal LFSRs uses irreducible
polynomial p(x) of degree n. A maximal LFSR has the highest
period, the period of the LFSR is the time it takes for the
register to return to its initial state. A short period makes
it easier to predict the output. A polynomial is irreducible
Fig. 2: General Architecture of the Hash Function
if x2
n
= x mod p(x). For a polynomial p(x), the n-bit
Galois LFSR is constructed by tapping the positions in the
register that are part of p(x). In operation, bits that are
tapped get XOR’ed with the output bit and shifted, while
untapped bits are shifted without changed. The output bit is
the input to the LFSR. In algorithm V.2, we generate random
polynomials and apply the Ben-Or irreducibility test [13]. The
polynomials are generated by sampling the uniform distribu-
tion, unif(1, 2n − 1). For example, p = 123 with binary
representation 01111011 encodes p(x) = 1+x+x3+x4+x5.
The worst case runtime complexity of the Ben-Or algorithm
is O(n2 log2(n) log log(n)). However, the Ben-Or algorithm
is efficient as per our experiments in Section VIII-A.
Algorithm V.2 Irreducible polynomial generation using Ben-
Or Irreducibility Test
while true do
Generate poly p(x) ∈ GF (2) of degree at most n
for i := 1 to n/2 do
g := gcd(p, x2
i − x mod p);
if g 6= 1 then
’p is reducible’
break
end if
end for
return ’p is irreducible’
end while
D. LFSR Chaining
For a set of N LFSRs, the goal of the chaining strategy
is to define the logic for enabling the LFSRs. The input of
the enable logic is the memory address being processed, not
the data itself. By using the memory address, the attacker will
have a harder time to perform a memory redirection attack.
The logic is constructed by creating a random binary tree of
depth n. The tree defines the control flow of each loop in
the IC-program. The control variable at each level is a unique
memory address bit.
Each level decides if an LFSR is enabled or not. For each
node, an LFSR is enabled/disabled, and then the program
counter jumps to either child by comparing an address bit.
enable LSFR i
if (a[i] == true) go to child 1
if (a[i] == false) go to child 2
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Fig. 3: Control Structure
In case the node only has one child, the jump instruction will
be omitted for a continuous execution. Figure 3 shows the
structure of the generated tree.
By providing a program with a randomly generated struc-
ture, the attacker cannot predict the program’s structure based
on previous runs. The attacker is required to perform static
analysis on the program (instructions) if she is to attempt to
evade the checking algorithm.
VI. POWER ANALYSIS
We verify the execution of POWERALERT-protocol using
the current drawn by the processor. We learn the normal
Power Finite State machine (PFSM) model using training data
from the machine. Then for each round of the POWERALERT-
protocol we extract the power states and confirm that they are
generated by the normal model.
In the following section we explain the method for current
measurement, the method to extract the power states from
a current signal, the high-level PFSM model, the method to
learn the normal parameters of the model, and the method
for validation. Finally, we use the learned model to aid in the
parameter selection for IC-program generation.
A. Measurement Method
The current drawn by the processor is measured using
a current measuring loop placed around the line, shown in
Figure 4. Our setup works for computers with motherboards
that have separate power line for the processor. Our generation
and verification algorithms are not limited to any sampling
rate; in fact, the algorithms can be adapted for any sampling
rate depending on the needed accuracy. We measure the
current directly by tapping the line from the power supply to
the CPU socket on the motherboard; as opposed to measuring
the power usage by using the instrumentation provided by
the processor as the data will pass through the untrusted
software stack. Such data is susceptible to manipulation and
cannot be trusted as an absolute truth. On the other hand,
direct measurement provides a trusted side channel that we
use to validate that an untampered POWERALERT-protocol is
executed.
Fig. 4: The current measurement loop place around the CPU
power line.
The measured current signal is either stored for model
learning or processed in near real-time for POWERALERT-
protocol execution validation.
B. Extracting the Power States
We observe that the current drawn by a processor during
an operation takes the form of multilevel power states, where
each state draws a constant current level. Such behavior is
consistent with the way a processor work: different operations
use different parts of the processor’s circuitry. As each part
of the processor switches dynamic current passes through the
transistors. Thus different combinations of the circuitry will
draw different current levels. Thus to learn the power models
of operations, we start by extracting the power states exhibited
in a current signal.
We start by filtering i(t) using a lowpass filter, h1(t) to
remove high frequency noise from the signal, il(t) = i(t) ∗
h1(t). Then we compute the derivative of the filtered signal,
I(t) = il(t)
′. The derivative will be near zero for the pieces of
i(t) with a constant current level. We filter the derived signal
I(t) with another lowpass filter, h2(t), to remove more high
frequency noise, If (t) = I(t) ∗ h2(t). Finally, we compute
a threshold of the signal using an indicator function I>λ(t).
The indicator function is 1 if the absolute value of a signal
is greater than λ. Figure 5 shows the block diagram of the
transformation. The transformation leads us to finding the
segments of the signal with constant current, those segments
are the power states. For each segment t = [ta, tb], we compute
the average i1 = 1tb−ta
∫ tb
ta
il(t)dt. The average represents the
current drawn during the power state. The duration of each
state is computed as τ = tb − ta.
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Fig. 5: Block diagram for power state extraction.
C. Power Models
We model the operations that take place in POWERALERT-
protocol, network and hashing operations, using Power Finite
State Machines (PFSM). The model and timing of each
power state are used by POWERALERT to validate that the
POWERALERT-protocol was running untampered.
A Power Finite State Machine (PFSM), proposed by
Pathak [25], is a state machine where each state represents
a power state Sk. Each power state has a constant amount of
current drawn ik. The duration of each state is not encoded
in the PFSM. A PFSM has an initial idle state S0 with
power level i(S0) = iidle. When an operation starts, such
as a network receive with a TCP socket, the PFSM moves
deterministically to another power state S1 with current level
i(S1) = i1 such that the total current drawn is iidle + i1.
The POWERALERT-protocol starts by a network commu-
nication (network operation) between POWERALERT and the
machine. Then the machine is supposed to load and run the
IC-program (hash operation). Below is the description of the
PFSM of the operations:
• A short network operation has a PFSM that moves from
the idle state S0 to S1 with current level i1. A long
network operation alternates between the S0 and S1; the
period is T µs. A short network operation is longer than
T µs. Figure 6b shows the current trace drawn during a
network operation.
• The hash operation has a a PFSM that moves from the
idle state S0 to S2 with current level i2. Then after the
hash function is loaded, it starts running and the power
state moves to S3 with current level t3. At the end of the
operation, the PFSM returns to the idle power state S0.
The duration of state S3 is equivalent to the time it takes
for the operation to execute. Figure 6a shows the current
trace drawn during a hash operation.
We merge the two state machines to follow the operation of
POWERALERT-protocol. The overall operation state machine
is shown in Figure 7. The POWERALERT-protocol PFSM starts
from state S0, it moves to S1 during the network operation
when the untrusted machine receives the hash function (IC-
program), address list, and the nonce. The PFSM then moves
to the hash operation, state S2 to load and S3 to run. Finally,
as the untrusted machine sends the result to POWERALERT the
PFSM switches to a network operation, state S1 in particular.
In the following, we explain the method for learning the
normal PFSM of a machine.
(a) Memory read and hash current trace
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(b) Network operation current trace
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Fig. 6: Current drawn during network and memory read
operations.
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Fig. 7: Power Finite State Machine (PFSM) of POWERALERT-
protocol
D. Learning the models
For each machine, we assume that we start the from an
initial uncompromised state. We establish a power behavioral
baseline, build the PFSM and a language for each operation,
and learn an execution time model. We initiate the POW-
ERALERT-protocol multiple times and store the current signal
for every run. For each signal the power states are extracted
using the method in section VI-B and the values of the current
drawn are averaged. Moreover, we establish the idle power
state by measuring power when no applications are running,
that is i(t) is constant.
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In our test machine, an AMD Athlon 64 machine running
Linux 4.1.13, the current drawn during the idle state is 870mA,
the current drawn during the load phase is 2.34A, the current
drawn during the hash phase is 1.580A, and the current drawn
during the network operation phase is 1.360A. The idle state
current depends on many factors including the services running
in the operating system and the semiconductor manufacturing
process. The manufacturing process determines static power
consumption (subthreshold conduction and tunneling current)
which is the current draw when the gates are not switching.
Thus the current levels in the generated are unique to the
machine and need to be learned for each machine. We de-
cided not fold in semiconductor aging into the power model.
Aging causes degradation of the transistor leading to failures;
however the time scale where aging affects performance is
in the order of 5 years. Specifically, aging has no effect on
dynamic power [15] but it does affect threshold voltage. The
static power is proportional to the threshold voltage [34].
Studies have shown that the threshold voltage varies within
1V during thermal accelerated aging [6] which causes a 0.4%
increase in static power. We consider this increase insignificant
to incorporate into the model especially that it requires years
to happen.
In the following, we learn a timing model using the training
data from the machine to be inspected and we propose the
method of validating the execution of the POWERALERT-
protocol using the learned PFSM and the timing model.
Retraining the models: In order to retrain the model when
needed. We opt for the following procedure: (1) backup the
data in permanent storage, (2) wipe storage, (3) install a
clean OS, (4) collect training data and learn the models,
and (5) restore permanent storage. This process, given our
assumption of no hardware attacks, ensures that the attacker
cannot interfere with the training process, as the persistent
storage is removed during the training phase.
E. Learning Power State Timing
We use timing information in our system as part of the
validation process. Specifically, we confirm that an adversary
is not trying to deceive POWERALERT by extracting the timing
information (duration) from each power state and compare
it to the learned model, the details are in the next section.
By extracting the timing information using the power signal
we control the accuracy of the measure as opposed to using
network RTT in remote attestation schemes which are affected
by the network conditions. Moreover, we have confidence that
the timing was not manipulated as it was extracted from an
untampered source. We learn the execution time model for the
hash phase and the network phase.
The hash function (IC-Program) has a variable number of
instructions to execute per cycle and a variable input set
size. We consider the general structure of the IC-program
(Section V-A) f(L, η), where N = |L| is the size of the input
set, and ‖f‖c is the number of instructions executed by hash
function each iteration. All IC-programs have a a complexity
O(c · N) where N is the input size and c is the number of
Fig. 8: Power State Timing model for hashing phase.
instruction per loop, and use the same type of instructions as
any IC-program. We postulate that any IC-program of equal
input size N and c number of instructions will have the same
execution time. Thus to obtain the training data for learning
the timing model, we generate IC-programs for different input
size and instruction count and find the execution duration per
program.
The experiments are repeated multiple times; the results
are averaged to account for the indeterministic nature of
program execution. We use multivariate linear regression to
learn a model of the execution time of the IC-program.
The model uses predictor variables x = [N, ‖f‖c] and a
response variable y = t (execution time). For our test machine,
Figure 8 shows the data points for duration at power state
S2 during the hash phase of the POWERALERT-protocol. The
surface drawn is the learned model, with implicit equation
y = 1.3958+ 0.081x(1)− 0.017x(2) + 0.008x(1)× x(2) and
mean error σ = 5.4542µs. The mean error of the model is
significant because it determines the leeway the adversary. If
the error is high, then the attacker has a wide gap to employ
evasion techniques. However, a minor error means that the
attacker has a small gap for evasion. Figure 9 shows the impact
of an attacker injecting instructions into the program. The plot
shows the current signal measured during the hash phase. The
blue signal is the normal behavior, and the orange signal is
the tampered one. Both signals have the same power states.
However the tampered signal stays longer in the second state.
During the network phase, the machine is either receiving
data or sending the result. When the POWERALERT-protocol
is initiated, the CPU performs an IO operation to transfer data
from the network card. While when the machine returns the
results, the CPU performs an IO operation to transfer data to
the network card. We learn the timing model of the network
phase by varying the number of bytes to be transferred and
then measuring the time it takes to transfer those bytes. Using
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Fig. 9: Timing difference in current signal due to tampering.
our test machine, yn = 0.129× x+ 12.48 is the linear model
that predicts the timing for the network phase as a function
of the number of bytes (x). The mean error of the model is
σn = 1.902µs. The model’s constant component is the time it
takes the OS to create the buffers and the linear component is
the time to transfer the data over the buses using DMA. The
linear coefficient models the bus speed.
F. Measurement Validation
POWERALERT measures the current drawn in real-time
when it initiates the protocol and attempts to validate
that the power trace is generated by the POWERALERT-
protocol PFSM. The power states are extracted from the
current signal resulting in a sequence of states S =
S(0), S(1), S(2), . . . , S(n). The sequence of states is matched
to the regular language which is generated by the POW-
ERALERT-protocol PFSM learned by POWERALERT during
the training phase (Figure 7).
L = (S0, S1)
+(S0, S2, S3, S0)(S0, S1).
The first part of the language, (S0, S1)+, is the protocol
initiation phase. The second part, (S0, S2, S3, S0), is the
hashing phase. Finally, the last part, (S0, S1), is the output
phase. Note it is expected for the output phase to be a short
network operation while the initiation phase to be a long
network operation.
During the current trace validation, POWERALERT extracts
the duration of each power state, and then the duration of each
operation phase. We use the timing information for confirming
that the duration of each phase is consistent with the protocol
operation and hashing. The expected duration of each phase
is determined by the following:
• For the hash phase: POWERALERT computes δ = |yˆ−yt|,
the difference between the expected execution time, yˆ,
and the measured execution time, yt. Malicious behavior
is detected if δ ≥ γmax(σm + σs), where σm is model
error, σs is the sampling error, and γ is a tolerance factor.
• For the network operation: POWERALERT computes
δn = |yˆn − yn,t|, where yˆn is the predicted time and
yn,t is the measured time. Malicious behavior is detected
if δn ≥ γmax(σn, σs), where σn is the model error, and
σs is the sampling error, and γ is a tolerance factor.
• A sanity check is performed to ensure that the total
duration of the phases is less than the RTT as measured
by POWERALERT’s clock.
The dynamic nature of the hash functions makes the use
of timing information effective. While an attacker can find a
faster implementation of a static integrity checking program to
evade time-based checks, we, on the other hand, use diversity
to prevent the attacker from adapting and thus keeping the
timing information a useful method for detecting manipulation.
G. Parameter Search
The gradient of the model, ∇y = ((0.008x(2) +
0.081), (0.008x(1)− 0.017)), reveals that while keeping x(1)
constant a slight increase in the number of instructions ex-
ecuted, x(2), leads to an increase in the execution time
proportional to the input size, x(1). A larger input size has a
greater impact. If an attacker were to inject some instructions
into the IC-program, the input size and the original number of
instructions determines ∇y(x), the increase in execution time.
The parameters of the IC-program impact the effectiveness
of the detection method. A small ∇y(x) will increase the false
positive rates. While, a large ∇y(x) will increase the cost to
initiate the POWERALERT-protocol. Moreover, the sampling
rate of the current measurement system in POWERALERT
constraints the minimum ∇y(x) allowed. The sampling rate is
determined by the hardware used, a hardware with low sam-
pling rate has a lower cost than that with a high sampling rate.
A high sampling rate requires more memory and bandwidth to
acquire, process, and store the data. In order to find the optimal
parameters for the IC-program, POWERALERT minimizes the
total running time constrained by the hardware sampling rate,
the cost to run the IC-program, and the coverage required.
Table I contains solutions for the optimization below using
parameters and models from our test environment.
minimize
N,‖f‖p
y(N, ‖f‖p)
subject to y(N, ‖f‖p + k)− y(N, ‖f‖p) > γ ·max(σm, σs)
yn(‖f‖p) > γ ·max(σn, σs)
‖f‖p < cost, N/Ntotal > coverage.
We compute the parameters of the IC-program for k = 4
with a tolerance factor γ = 10, cost = 300, and coverage =
0.000001. We varied the sampling rates for measuring cur-
rent; the sampling rates reflect the investment made into
POWERALERT’s capabilities. Our computations show that the
higher the sampling rate the smaller the IC-program has to be.
So if the designer invests more in the hardware capabilities of
POWERALERT, the attacker’s leeway will be tighter and with
low overhead to the machine.
VII. ATTACKER-VERIFIER GAME
In this section, we study the interactions between the POW-
ERALERT strategy and an attacker trying to persist in a target
machine. On a high-level, we introduce a continuous time
game to model the interactions between the attacker who is
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TABLE I: Minimum IC-Program parameters
Sampling
Rate
Error Toler-
ance (µs)
Coverage
(bytes)
Program
Size
1 MHz 64.542 2,019 40
500 KHz 74.542 2,331 40
250 KHz 94.542 2,956 40
200 KHz 104.542 3,269 40
54 KHz 239.727 7,493 40
trying to hide and a verifier using the POWERALERT strategy
to detect intruders. In this game, the verifier initiates the
POWERALERT-protocol at random times with a pre-defined
strategy. The attacker tries to anticipate the verifier’s strategy
and disables the malicious changes to the kernel in order to
avoid detection.
The verifier’s actions consist of deciding on the time instants
at which she wants to initiate the POWERALERT-protocol,
while the attacker’s actions consist of choosing time instants
at which she wants to hide her activity in order to avoid
detection. The attacker’s goal is to coincide her actions with
the verifier’s actions so that her malicious activity is hidden
when the POWERALERT-protocol is taking place. It is in the
verifier’s interest, however, that the attacker would disable her
malicious activities as much as possible. The verifier’s goal, on
the other hand, is to select a strategy that will catch the attacker
off-guard (i.e., when the malicious activity is not hidden) and
detect the attacker’s presence. In what follows, we first prove
that when the verifier chooses her action times independently
and identically distributed, then the attacker’s best strategy is
to hide her activities periodically with a fixed period T ∗. We
then use simulation to evaluate the interactions between the
attacker and the verifier for the scenario where the verifier
plays according to exponentially distributed attestation times.
We measure the probability of the attacker being detected, the
fraction of verifier actions that coincide with the attacker’s
action, as well the fraction of time in which the attacker’s
malicious activity is hidden, as a function of the rates of
play of both the verifier and the attacker (the rate λ0 of the
exponential distribution and the rate λ1 = 1T∗ of the periodic
distribution). We first formalize our game setting, present our
theorem, and then present our model and simulation results.
A. Formalization as a Game
We follow an approach similar to that presented in
FlipIt [31], a continuous time game in which both players
make stealthy moves (i.e., a player cannot obtain the state of
the game unless she makes a move, and thus cannot observe
her opponents’ moves unless she makes a move of her own)
in order to take control of a shared resource. Our formaliza-
tion differs from FlipIt in that moves are not instantaneous,
they rather spread over an interval of time. Furthermore, the
verifier’s moves in our game do not always yield a successful
outcome; they often fail either due to the attacker hiding her
malicious activity or due to memory coverage considerations.
In what follows we define the players’ actions, their views
of the game, their strategies, and the type of strategies we
consider in our simulation. We refer by player 0 to the verifier
and by player 1 to the attacker, and let B = {>,⊥} be the set
of Boolean constants true and false.
Definition VII.1. Attacker action. The attacker’s action con-
sists of hiding her malicious activity for a specified period of
time. Such an action would restore all of the kernel address
space location to their original state, thus avoid detection in
case the verifier initiates a POWERALERT-porotocol attestation
process. Formally, let c : R+ −→ B be the function defining
the state of the attacker’s malicious activity at any time t > 0,
i.e.,
c(t) =
{
> iff attacker is active at time t
⊥ otherwise
Let C be the state of all such state functions. We slightly abuse
the notation to write c([ta, tb]) to refer to the state of the
attacker’s activity in the time interval ta ≤ t ≤ tb.
An attacker’s action is therefore defined as a function a1 :
C −→ C that changes the state of the attacker’s activity for a
period of time α1. Formally,
a1(c([t, t+ α1]) =
{
⊥ iff c([t, t+ α1]) = >
c([t, t+ α1]) otherwise
Definition VII.2. Verifier action. The verifier’s action consists
of initiating the POWERALERT-protocol and attempting to
attest the victim machine’s kernel address space. An attestation
fails when the attacker has modified a memory location that
the verifier is attempting to attest. A successful attestation does
not necessarily mean the absence of malicious activities; the
attacker might have changed memory locations not requested
for attestation by the POWERALERT-protocol.
Formally, the verifier’s action is a function a0 : R+ −→ B
where a0(t) is the outcome of initiating an attestation process
at time t. a0(t) = > if the attestation succeeds and a0 = ⊥ if
the attestation fails and the verifier detects the presence of the
attacker. Let α0 be the length needed to complete an attestation
procedure, and let pe to the probability that an attacker evades
the verifier’s attestation attempt. In other words, pe refers to
the probability that the verifier’s action succeeds even in the
presence of an active attacker. Therefore for tv > 0, we can
write
a0(tv) =

> if ∃t ∈ [tv, tv + α0).C(t) = > w.p. pe
⊥ if ∃t ∈ [tv, tv + α0).C(t) = > w.p. 1− pe
> otherwise
The game ends if the attacker is detected, i.e, if ∃t > 0 such
that a0(t) = ⊥.
Definition VII.3. Feedback function. Let ti,k be the time at
which player i makes her k’th move. We refer by φi(ti,k) to
the feedback that player i receives when she makes an action
at time ti,k. The verifier can only observe the outcome of
her own actions while the attacker can observe the outcomes
of any action (i.e., attestation attempt) that the verifier has
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attempted between the time the attacker last move and the
current move time. Therefore we can write
φ0(t0,k) = {a0(t0,k)}
and
φ1(t1,k) = {a1(t1,k)} ∪
{a0(t0,j) | t1,k−1 + α1 < t0,j < t1,k + α1}
Definition VII.4. Player View. For each player i ∈ {0, 1}, we
define the player’s view of the game at time t as vi(t) =
{(ti,1, φi(ti,1)) , . . . , (ti,k, φi(ti,k))}, where ti,k ≤ t is the
time at which player i made her last move before time t.
We denote by V to be the set of all possible player views.
Definition VII.5. Player Strategy. A player’s strategy defines
the time instants at which she wants to make her move.
Formally, let vi(tk) be player i’s view at time ti,k = tk when
she made her k’th move, then the player’s strategy is a function
Si : V −→ R such that ti,k+1 = ti,k + S(vi(tk)).
Definition VII.6. Renewal Strategy. A strategy Si is a renewal
strategy if the action inter-arrival times are independent and
identically distributed. In other words, the action inter-arrival
times form a renewal process [3].
Theorem 1. If the verifier is playing with a renewal strategy,
then the attacker’s best strategy is to play periodically with a
fixed period T ∗.
Proof. Since the verifier’s action inter-arrival times are i.i.d.,
if at any time tk the attacker computes an optimal action play
time S1(v1(tk)), then S1(v1(tk)) would also be optimal any
other time instant t′k. Therefore the attacker’s best strategy to
play periodically with period T ∗ = S1(v1(tk)). Obtaining the
analytical expression of T ∗ is beyond the scope of this paper
and considered for future work.
Theorem 1 states that the attacker’s best response strategy to
an attacker playing with a renewal strategy is to play period-
ically. The theorem further illustrates an important advantage
that the attacker enjoys over the verifier, that of observability.
Since the verifier does not know if the attacker is present
or not, the events of a successful verification attempt and
the attacker hiding her activity are indistinguishable. In other
words, the verifier cannot observe the attacker’s actions, and
thus must choose her strategy before playing the game. As for
the attacker, the verifier’s actions are completely observable,
and thus she can use that information to further improve her
strategy.
B. Simulation and Results
We implement a model of our game using Stochastic
Activity Networks (SAN) [26] in the Mo¨bius modeling and
simulation tool [7]. In accordance with theorem 1, we assume
that the verifier is playing with an exponential strategy with
rate λ0, while the attacker plays with periodic strategy with
rate λ1 = 1T1 , where T1 is the attacker’s period. We vary the
players’ rates λ0 and λ1, and evaluate the performance of their
strategies with respect to three metrics: (1) the probability of
detection, (2) the fraction of time the attacker is inactive, and
(3) the hit ratio. We compute the probability of detection as
the average fraction of simulation runs in which the game has
ended. We define the attacker’s inactivity indicator function as
I(t) =
{
1 iff C(t) = ⊥
0 otherwise.
For a time period T , we can then write the fraction of time
the attacker is inactive as 1T
∫ T
0
I(t)dt. We finally define
the hit ratio as the fraction of verifier actions that coincide
with attacker actions. In other words, the hit ratio refers to
the fraction of attestation attempts that succeed because the
attacker has turned off her malicious activity.
For our simulations, we assume that the verifier is using
a sampling rate of 500KHz. From Table I, we know that
the coverage of the verifier’s generated programs is 2331
bytes. For a machine running the Linux 4.1.13 kernel with an
average kernel memory size of 200 MB, we can compute the
probability of evasion as pe = 1 − 2331200∗1024∗1024 = 0.99998.
Also, using our learned model in Section VI-E, we can
compute the time needed for attestation α0 = 903µs.
We vary the attacker’s period (T1) from 30 seconds to
5 minutes in steps of 10 seconds, and the verifier actions’
average inter-arrival times (T0) from 1 minutes to 3 minutes
in steps of 15 seconds. Additionally, we assume that the
attacker chooses to hide her activity for half of her period,
i.e. α1 = T12 =
1
2λ1
. We run our simulation for 10 days and
report average results for all of our metrics.
Figures 10 and 11 show the probability of detection and
the fraction of time the attacker is inactive, as a function of
the attacker’s play rate λ1 and the verifier’s play rate λ0,
respectively. For a fixed attacker play rate, the probability
of detection increases as the verifier is increasing her play
rate. Intuitively, the verifier is performing more attestation
procedures, and thus the probability that an attestation takes
place while the attacker is active increases, so it is more likely
that the verifier will be able to detect the attacker’s presence.
For a fixed verifier strategy, decreasing the attacker’s play
rate would yield a reduction in the probability of detection.
As the attacker is playing slower, her period increases, and
thus she would have to hide her malicious activity for longer
periods of time (if λ1 > λ′1 then
1
2λ1
< 12λ′1
). Therefore
it is more likely that the verifier’s attestation attempt will
coincide with the time she has her malicious activity hidden,
thus reducing her probability of detection. This is shown in
Figure 11 where for a fixed verifier play rate, the fraction
of time where the attacker turns off her malicious activity
decreases as her play rate increases. This is further confirmed
by Figure 12 where the hit ratio is at its highest when
the attacker is playing slow, and decreases as the attacker
increases her play rate. This means that when the attacker
is playing slowly, she is hiding more often and thus avoiding
the verifier’s attestations, therefore reducing the probability
of being detected. This however comes at the expense of
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her activity time, the slower she plays, the longer she has
to turn off her malicious activity, reaching a fraction of 70%
of inactivity when the verifier is playing at her slowest rate.
Another interesting result is revealed by the peaks of the
surface in Figures 11 and 12. The fraction of the time the
attacker is inactive reaches its peak when the attacker is
playing slowly while the verifier is acting at her fastest rate.
This is due to the fact that a high verifier rate induces a high
hit ratio, thus during one period of inactivity, the attacker
might have to go through multiple attestation procedures, and
might even have to extend her inactivity period if an attestation
procedure is started right before the end of that period.
Furthermore, when the verifier chooses a slow rate of
play, the rate of increase in the probability of detection as
a function of the attacker’s play rate is slow. Therefore it is
best for the attacker, in this case, to play fast, thus reducing
her fraction of inactivity time while maintaining a relatively
acceptable probability of detection. Therefore a slow rate of
play for the verifier puts her at a disadvantage where that
attacker can play fast, increase her activity time and still avoid
detection. However, as the defender starts increasing her rate
of play, the attacker faces a trade-off between the probability of
detection and the fraction of inactivity time. Achieving high
levels of activity means risking higher detection probability
while keeping the detection probability low would require the
attacker to remain inactive for longer periods of time. The
decision on such a trade-off depends on the attacker’s level of
stealthiness. An attacker who would want to remain stealthy, as
in the case of an APT, would be more inclined to turn off their
malicious activities more often than an attacker who’s goal
is to inflict the maximum amount of damage in the shortest
period of time.
In summary, our simulation results show that the usage of
the POWERALERT-protocol for checking the integrity of the
kernel space would force a malicious attacker to balance a
trade-off between risk of detection and periods of activity.
An attacker that wishes to remain active as much as possible
would risk a higher probability of detection, while an attacker
that seeks to remain stealthy would have to incur periods of
inactivity that can be as high as 70% of her life time.
VIII. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of POW-
ERALERT in generating the IC-Program and the size of space
of IC-Programs.
A. IC-Program Generation
In the program generation algorithm, the hard problem is
the generation of random irreducible polynomials of degree
d in GF (2). We implement the generation algorithm using
NTL [29], A Library for doing Number Theory, on a Rasp-
berry PI 2 v1.1. The results in Figure 13 show the average
time it takes to generate the LFSRs for each degree d using our
implementation compared to the worst case complexity. Our
implementation performs orders of magnitude better than the
worst case runtime. Practically speaking it takes around one
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Fig. 10: The average probability of the attacker’s detection as
a function of the attacker’s and the verifier’s play rates.
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Fig. 11: The average fraction of the time the attacker’s
malicious activity is hidden as a function of the attacker’s
and the verifier’s play rates.
second to generate an irreducible polynomial of degree 128.
The performance can be significantly improved by either op-
timizing the algorithm, parallelizing the generation algorithm,
or precomputing and then caching the generated polynomials.
The rate of initiation of the POWERALERT-protocol should
be less than that of the rate of IC-program generation for the
system to be stable. In our simulation we explored the effect
of different initiation rates on the defender utility.
B. Maximum IC-Programs
We want to investigate the maximum number of IC-
programs that can be generated by POWERALERT. The goal
is to have a large space so that the generated programs are
not reused. An IC-program is generated by chaining randomly
generated LFSRs of degree d using a randomly generated
binary tree of depth n. The maximum number of IC-programs
that can be generated is the product of the maximum number of
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Fig. 12: The average ratio of attestation tasks that were evaded
by the attacker’s actions as a function of the attacker’s and the
verifier’s play rates.
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irreducible polynomial for degree d
binary trees multiplied by the maximum number of irreducible
polynomials. Let the maximum number of binary trees with
depth n be tn (equations below). The maximum number
of nodes for a binary tree of depth n is 2n and thus the
total number of tree is the sum of the Catalan number Cm,
which the number of binary tree with m nodes, over the total
number of possible nodes. Let Md be the maximum number
of irreducible polynomials of degree d in GF (2), Md is called
the necklace polynomial.
tn =
2n∑
i=0
(
i∏
k=2
i+ k
k
)
,Md(2) =
1
d
∑
k|d
µ(k)2d
Finally, the total number of IC-programs that can be gen-
erated is Dd,n = Md(2) × tn. Figure 14 shows the total
number of programs for an increasing degree of polynomials
and depth of tree. The maximum number of programs reaches
1.9721 × 1026 for n = 40 and d = 5 guarantees that no
program ever gets reused in the lifetime of the device, in fact
if a new program is generated every one second the space
would be depleted in 6.246× 1018 years.
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Fig. 14: Maximum Number of IC-Programs a varying tree
depth and polynomial degree.
C. Performance Impact
When the POWERALERT-protocol is initiated and the IC-
program starts execution, execution of all other tasks is paused.
This is needed in order to ensure that no other tasks interfere
with the current measured from the CPU. In terms of graphical
responsiveness, the pixel response time should not exceed
4ms [24]. The POWERALERT-procotol is initiated, on average,
once every minute for 0.9ms. Thus the graphical degradation
will not be noticeable by a user. Moreover, we measured the
performance degradation to be a factor of 0.0018.
IX. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss some security details related to
the implementation of this system. Specifically, we discuss the
attack surface of POWERALERT and the security concerns with
the IC-Program. Moreover, we consider the practicality of our
solution, and it’s important despite the existence of TPMs.
A. Implementation Details
Each POWERALERT device has a client on the untrusted
machine. The client is a low-level module that communi-
cates with POWERALERT. The client can be implemented
for placement in the kernel or the hypervisor. The commu-
nication channel between POWERALERT and the client can
be over any medium such as Ethernet, USB, or serial. All
those channels are feasible because of the proximity between
POWERALERT and the untrusted machine. The use of serial
or USB communication is advantageous because it limits the
attacker to physical attacks, making man-in-the-middle and
collusion attacks harder. If the attacker has physical access to
the machine, then she could tamper with POWERALERT.
The client receives the IC-Program as machine code over
the communication channel. POWERALERT signs the code,
their keys are exchanged during the initialization phase of the
system. The signed program allows the machine to attest that
POWERALERT is the generator. We propose using a stream
cipher as it has better performance than public-private key
ciphers or block ciphers.
As for the POWERALERT’s hardware, the resource re-
quirements are minimal. We implemented a prototype using
Raspberry PI 2. The prototype uses an ADC to convert the
current measurements from the current loop to a digital signal.
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The ADC uses a sampling rate of 500KHz; most low-cost
hardware can handle this sampling rate. Moreover, power state
extraction is only performed when the POWERALERT-Protocol
is initiated, the operation does not need to be real-time.
B. POWERALERT’s Attack Surface
In case the untrusted machine gets compromised, an at-
tacker might try to compromise POWERALERT to disable its
functionality. The attack surface of power is limited to one
communication channel that only uses the POWERALERT-
Protocol. During the protocol POWERALERT receives the
output of the IC-Program only. The current measurements are
out of the control of the attacker. The language of the protocol
is context-free and thus can be verified using Language-
theoretic security approaches [4]. By verifying the parser, we
have an assurance that even if the attacker compromises the
machine, it cannot spread to POWERALERT.
C. Comparison to TPM
POWERALERT does not rely on specialized hardware within
the untrusted machine such as TPM or Intel’s AMT. However,
POWERALERT and trusted modules are orthogonal systems;
whereas TPMs provide a method for secure boot, dynamic
integrity checking is still costly and harder to enforce. POW-
ERALERT provides an external security solution that can be
tied to a security management across a wide network. In fact,
POWERALERT can use Intel’s AMT as a communication chan-
nel. Finally, our work demonstrates the need for measurements
that do not pass through or origin in the untrusted machine.
Such measurements reduce the risk of attacker tampering and
mimicry.
X. SECURITY ANALYSIS
POWERALERT uses current measurements, timing infor-
mation, and diversity of the IC-program to protect against
attackers subverting integrity checking. In this section we list
how POWERALERT addresses the attacks in section III-B. In
all cases, the power measurements ensure that detection is
certain if the attacker was to perform parallel tasks, as she
will be drawing more current than expected.
Proxy Attack: If the attacker attempts to forward the IC-
program to a remote machine to compute and return the result
via the same network link. POWERALERT can detect this
attack by examining its effects on the current trace and timing
of the network phase. Using the current trace, POWERALERT
will observe that network operations took longer than expected
as more bytes will be transferred between the CPU and
the network card. The size of the IC-program, which was
picked by the optimization in Section VI-G, ensures that our
hardware will pickup the re-transmission. For our test machine,
Table I shows that 40 instructions per iteration is enough.
Any physical attack that such as tapping the network line,
or firmware changes to the NIC are not within our purview.
Data Pointer redirection attack: The attacker stores an
unmodified copy of the data in another portion of memory.
When an address is to be checked, the attacker changes the
address to be checked with the unmodified portion. The IC-
program uses the address and the memory content when
computing the hash function. In order to compute a valid hash,
the attacker has to change the address to the location of the
copy while retaining the original address. Conservatively, the
attacker has to add at least four instructions (k = 4) per loop
in order to achieve that goal. Table I shows the parameters
of the IC-program to ensure detection given our measurement
error.
Static Analysis: Analyzing a flattened control flow is NP-
Hard [32]. Thus it will not be possible for the attacker to
analyze the program without significant computations.
Active Analysis: Active reverse engineering is used to
learn the usage patterns of the IC-program. POWERALERT
changes the IC-Program each time the POWERALERT-protocol
is initiated; the diversity renders the information learned by
the attacker from the previous run obsolete. Moreover, the
probability that a program will ever get repeated is 1/1020.
Attacker Hiding: In case the attacker attempts to hide,
she has to predict when the POWERALERT-protcol is initi-
ated. POWERALERT’s random initiation mechanisms ensures
that the attacker does not predict those instances. Our game
theoretic analysis shows that using an exponential initiation
strategy, the attacker’s best strategy is to either always hide if
the verifier is aggressive or attempt to hide without avail and
get detected eventually.
Forced Retraining: In case the attacker forces POW-
ERALERT to retrain by simulating a hardware fault that
requires a CPU change, in order to lead POWERALERT to
a compromised model. Then POWERALERT’s process is to
wipe the permanent storage, retrain using a clean OS, and
then restore data. Since, we assume that the attacker does
not modify the hardware state, then by removing permanent
storage, she cannot impact the retraining process.
XI. RELATED WORK
1) Timing Attestation: Seshadri et al. propose Pioneer [27]
extended by Kovah et. al. [21] a timing-based remote attes-
tation system for legacy system (without TPM). The timing
is computed using the network round trip time. The work
assumes that the machine can be restricted to execution in
one thread. The issue with the work is that the round trip time
is affected by the network conditions which the authors do
not explore, a heavily congested network will lead to a high
variation on the RRT causing a high rate of false positives.
Moreover, the restriction of execution in one thread can be
evaded by a lower level attacker. In later work the authors
discuss the issues of Time Of Check, Time Of Use attacks,
we talk the problem in our work. Later work adapted timing
attestation to embedded devices [12].
Herna´ndez et. al. [16] implement a monitor integrity check-
ing system by estimating the time it takes for a software to
run. The timing information is sent from the machine to a
remote server that uses a phase change detection algorithms
to detect malicious changes. The issue of this work is that
the timing information is sent by the untrusted machine and
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thus the information can be easily manipulated. Armknecht et.
al. [2] propose a generalized framework for remote attestation
in embedded systems. The authors use timing as a method
to limit the ability of an attacker to evade detection. The
framework formalizes the goals of the attacker and defender.
The authors provide a generic attestation scheme and prove
sufficient conditions for provable secure attestation schemes.
2) Power Malware Detection: Several researchers use
power usage to detect malware. In WattsUPDoc Clark [8]
collect power usage data by medical embedded devices and
extract features for anomaly detection. The authors exploit the
regularity of the operation of an embedded device to detect
irregularities. The authors however do not investigate mimicry
attacks. Kim et. al. [19] use battery consumption as a method
to detect energy greedy malware. The power readings are
sent from the untrusted device to a remote server to compare
against a trusted baseline. The problem of this work is that
the power readings can be manipulated by the attacker as the
data is sent through the untrusted software. PowerProf [20] is
another in-device unsupervised malware detection that uses
power profiles. The power information is similarly passed
through the untrusted stack and is thus susceptible to attacker
evasion through tampering.
3) Hardware Attestation: Secure Boot [10] verifies the
integrity of the system, with the root of trust a bootloader.
Later on Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) uses Platform
Configuration Registers (PCRs) store the secure measurements
(hash) of the system. Both methods are static in that the
integrity is checked at boot time. Dynamic attestation on the
other hand can perform attestation on the current state of the
system. Such features are supported by CPU extensions (for
example Intel TXT). El Defrawy et al. propose SMART [11],
an efficient hardware-software primitive to establish a dynamic
root of trust in an embedded processor, however the authors
do not assume any hardware attack.
4) VM based Integrity checker: OSck [17] proposed by
Hofmann et. al. is a KVM based kernel integrity checker
that inspects kernel data structures and text to detect rootkits.
The checker runs as a guest OS thread but is isolated by
the hypervisor. Most VMM introspection intergrity checker
assume a trusted hypervisor. Those techniques are vulnerable
to hardware level attacks [22], [30], [33]. In our work we
do not have any trust assumption as the attestation device is
external to the untrusted machine.
5) Checksum Diversity: Wang et. al. [32] propose using
diversity of probe software for security. The authors obfuscate
the control flow by flattening the probing software in order
to make it harder for an attacker to reverse engineer the
program for evasion. While the flattened control flow is hard
to statically analyze, the programs are susceptible to active
learning thus allowing an attacker to adapt over time. Giffin
et. al. [14] propose self-modifying to detect modification
of checksum code modification. The experiments show an
overhead of 1 microsecond to each checksum computation, the
method is however costly for large programs adding second
per check. The authors in [1] use randomized address checking
and memory noise to achieve unpredictability.
XII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we presented POWERALERT an external
integrity checker that uses power measurements as a trust
base. The power signal provides an untainted, trusted, and very
accurate method for observing the behavior of the untrusted
computer. POWERALERT initiates the interrogation protocol
with a randomly generated integrity checking program. The
diversity of the IC-program prevents the attacker from adapt-
ing. We show that the space of IC-programs is impossible to
exhaust and that the generation is very efficient for low-power
devices. POWERALERT measures the current drawn by the
processor during computation and compares it to a learned
model to validate the output of the untrusted machine. We
model the interaction between POWERALERT and the attacker
with as a time continuous game. The attacker disables her
malicious activities at randomly chosen time instants in order
to evade POWERALERT’s integrity checks. Our simulations
show that the attacker trades off stealthiness and her period
of inactivity. An attacker that would want to remain stealthy
needs to remain inactive for longer periods of time and an
increase in her activity period leads to an increase in the
probability of her being detected by POWERALERT. We also
show that even of a stealthy attacker, POWERALERT still
achieves an acceptable probability of detection given the long
lifetime of stealthy APTs; by remaining stealthy, the attacker
delays the inevitable and incurs extended periods of inactivity.
Going forward we will formally prove the insights that the
simulations have shown, and seek to find equilibrium and
dominant strategies for POWERALERT.
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